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RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY 
l"l 1 1 1 l 1 1 'Ipp*;'] .1 c I''I'l , 
VS. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Third-party Plaintiff, 
VALLEY CENTRAL. BANK, 
Third-party Defendant. 
Case No. 910413 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF" JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant o "JL~:* ^^J.^ nn. 
Sec. 78-2-2(3) _ 
: STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The State agrees with the statement of issues presented 
and standards ol review found ir? ar>r>ellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Department Transportation generally 
concurs with the statement IM CMSH as n - •:<»>.1 lance, 
except as noted: 
A. Nature of the Case 
The assertion of Reliance to the effect that UDOT's 
liquidated damage provision does not provide for a reduction 
based on substantial completion and that whether the project is 
.9 or 99.9 per cent complete makes no difference in the daily 
charge of $600 is true but irrelevant. The intent of the 
contract was that the work be completed by a date certain and it 
does not contemplate "substantial completion" or a reduction in 
the daily liquidated damage amount. Liquidated damages are 
provided to compensate for increased overhead and unless the 
project is complete certain costs are incurred regardless of the 
stage of completion. In this case UDOT's actual damages or 
increased overhead approximately equals the liquidated damages 
assessed so there is no reason to reduce the daily charge. 
Young's statement concerning the fact that Young defaulted 
on several other projects and that Reliance paid out over 
$2,000,000 may be true when all of Young's projects are 
considered but not as a result of this project. Documented 
evidence in this case shows that Young made over $1,000,000 
profit on this project (Exhibit 91). 
UDOT does not agree that it is correct to characterize 
this suit as a breach of contract action. The trial court agreed 
with UDOT that the contract should be enforced as written. There 
is no breach of contract. 
B. Proceedings and Disposition by Trial Court 
The case was tried to the court on March 26-29, 1991. 
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Reliance sought a recovery of $94,800 withheld by UDOT based on 
the contract provision which specified that all work was to be 
completed by November 27, 1985 (said date includes a 43-day time 
allowance for delay caused by UDOT conceded during contract 
performance) and that for every day after said date that the work 
remained incomplete that Young was to be assessed $600.00 to 
cover UDOT's increased overhead. UDOT conceded at trial that its 
calculation of liquidated damages was in error by two days and 
admitted that it owed Reliance $1200.00. The correct calculation 
is computed by deducting 42 days from the 198-day period between 
November 28, 1985 and June 13, 1986, the date the project was 
accepted as complete. The 42 days is a concession granted after 
the project was complete. For purposes of calculation UDOT 
stipulated at trial that the original completion date of October 
15, 1985 was continued 85 days (43 days for delay caused by UDOT 
and 42 days granted by UDOT as "good faith") which would have 
moved the date to January 8, 1986. UDOT argued that its actual 
damages incurred for engineering and administrative costs totaled 
in excess of $82,000 and that this sum reasonably relates to the 
amount assessed as liquidated damages. The court agreed with 
UDOT and sustained the assessment of liquidated damages as 
reduced at trial by $1200.00 which said sum was awarded to 
Reliance. The court agreed that under the language of the 
provisions relating to completion date contracts that the 
doctrine of substantial completion does not apply to the facts of 
this case. 
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C. Designation of the Parties 
The PLAINTIFF and APPELLANT is Reliance Insurance Company 
and is referred to hereafter as Reliance. Reliance is surety for 
L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and became the assignee to 
Young prior to the completion of the project in 1986. 
L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY was the contractor 
and by reason of its assignment to Reliance is not a party to 
this action or appeal, and is referred to hereafter as Young. 
The UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION is the DEFENDANT and 
APPELLEE, and is the owner of the project and is referred to 
hereafter as UDOT. 
The FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION administers federal aid 
funding. While not a party to the contract they are often 
involved behind the scene in decisions related to contract 
performance and funding. They are referred to hereafter as FHWA. 
The project is situated on Interstate 80 between Black 
Rock and Old Saltair in Salt Lake County and is a federal aid 
project designated as IR-80-3(95)102 and is referred to hereafter 
as "the project". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
UDOT considers the Statement of the Facts contained in the 
Appellants' brief to be slanted in some instances in favor of 
Reliance's theory of the case and inadequate for the purpose of 
its brief and theory on appeal and therefore submits the 
following: 
1. Section 108.06 of the Standard Specifications 
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applicable to the contract as amended, in pertinent part reads as 
follows: 
"The number of days allowed for completion of the 
work included in the contract will be stated in the 
proposal and contract, and will be known as the 
"contract time". 
When the contract completion time is a fixed 
calendar date, it shall be the date on which all 
work on the project shall be completed. 
Suspension of work on some, but not all items, as 
ordered by the engineer, shall be considered 
partial suspension. Partial suspension may apply 
to working day or calendar day contracts. 
When final acceptance has been duly made by the 
Engineer as prescribed in Subsection 105.16, the 
daily time charge will cease". (Emphasis supplied.) 
(Exhibit 4.) 
2. Section 108.07 of the Standard Specifications 
specifies how "contract time" may be increased. For completion 
date contracts it specifies that additional time shall be added 
in calendar days. It also states that: 
"If the Engineer finds that work was delayed 
because of conditions beyond the control and 
without the fault of the contractor" that time may 
be extended "in such amount as the conditions 
justify". (Emphasis supplied.) (Exhibit 4.) 
3. Section 108.08 of the Standard Specifications in 
pertinent part reads as follows: 
"For each calendar day . . . after a specified 
completion date that any work shall remain 
uncompleted after the contract time specified for 
the completion of the work provided for in the 
contract, the sum specified below will be deducted 
from any money due the contractor, not as a 
penalty, but as liquidated damages for Department's 
increased overhead: provided, however, that due 
account shall be taken of any adjustment of the 
contract time for completion of the work granted 
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under the provisions of subsection 108.07. 
The Department may waive such portions of the 
liquidated damages as may accrue after the work is 
in condition for safe and convenient use by the 
traveling public." (The table showing the daily 
time charges based on the total dollar amount of 
the contract follows but is omitted here. The 
daily charge applicable to this contract is $600.00 
per day as provided in the amended table set forth 
in Addendum number 2.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
(Exhibit 4.) 
4. Early in the project it was discovered that a 
materials site which Young was using and which had been provided 
by UDOT was not properly cleared for use and UDOT paid Young by 
supplemental agreement to relocate into another site. The time 
between cessation of operations in the first site and the 
resumption of operations in the second site amounted to 43 days. 
This time delay is considered beyond the control and without the 
fault of Young (exhibits 47 & 62). 
5. The work of paving the main lines of 1-80 was completed 
October 17, 1985, Young continued other work on the contract 
until January 13, 1986 when all signs were in place, then 
suspended work due to winter conditions. No work occured during 
the period between January 14, 1986 and February 24, 1986 
(exhibit 84). 
6. UDOT personnel continued to monitor the project on a 
daily basis as well as to perform work related to final 
accounting for pay quantities during the winter months of January 
and February 1986 (tr. 382-386). 
7. Several items of work remained uncompleted on February 
24,1986 with the primary one being the placement and spreading of 
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topsoil. When operations resumed they continued until June 13, 
1986 when the project was accepted by UDOT. A final inspection 
was conducted on July 21, 1986 and a "punch list" of uncompleted 
items was issued. The "punch list" items were not completed 
until September 21, 1986 (exhibit 54). 
8. Young requested time extensions or a waiver of 
liquidated damages for various reasons by their letters of 25 
October 1985 and 14 November 1985 (exhibits 39 & 41). 
9. UDOT's Engineer, John Nye, granted Young's request to 
the extent of a 43 day extension for the materials site problem. 
His letter dated April 15, 1986 gives reasons for his denial of 
any further time extension (exhibit 47). 
10. Young by letter dated July 25, 1986 requested an 
additional time extension and explained troubles encountered with 
placement of topsoil (exhibit 55). 
11. On July 9, 1986 the topsoil sub-contractor, Sunbird, 
wrote to Young and stated its reasons why it had not completed 
the work earlier (exhibit 52). Said letter states that Sunbird 
was prepared to begin work in August 1985 but that Young delayed 
the start of their work until October 14, 1985. 
12. UDOT's engineer, John Nye, transmitted Young's letter 
of July 25, 1986 to Bert Taylor, UDOT's Chief Construction 
Engineer and outlined reasons why he felt some consideration 
should be given to Young (exhibit 56). 
13. On or about October 15, 1986, UDOT's engineer, John 
Nye met with Richard Laubsch of the Federal Highway 
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Administration (FHWA) and reviewed Young's performance of the 
work for the purpose of securing some concession in the charging 
of time. FHWA is the agency which controls federal aid funding. 
It was agreed that FHWA would concur in a 42 day time extension 
which coincides with the period in January and February of 1986 
when no work occurred (exhibit 82). 
14. Thereafter supplemental agreement number 12 was 
prepared which included the 43 day extension for the materials 
site problem which was the fault of UDOT and the additional 42 
day extension which FHWA agreed it would concur in for a total of 
85 days (exhibit 57). 
15. The 85-day extension effectively moved the completion 
date for the purpose of calculating the delay period to January 
8# 1986. The number of calendar days between January 9, 1986 and 
June 13, 1986 totals 156 days and became the basis for the 
liquidated damages assessed. John Nye had erroneously calculated 
the time as 158 days. At trial UDOT conceded that it owed 
Reliance for two days at $600.00 per day for a total of $1200.00. 
The total amount of liquidated damages based on 156 days is 
$93,600 (exhibit 84). 
16. UDOT incurred expenses during December 1985 and from 
January 1, 1986 through June 1986 totalling $82,631.16 (exhibits 
64 & 65). Said charges were billed to FHWA and UDOT received 
federal aid reimbursement. 
17. Bert Taylor, UDOT's Chief Construction Engineer sent 
a memorandum to the Division Administrator for FHWA dated 
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December 4, 1986 and requested some leeway in the charging of 
liquidated damages in certain conditions. Attached to his 
memorandum was a letter from counsel for Reliance which sought 
relief from the charging of liquidated damages (exhibit 59) . At 
trial Taylor explained his motivation in sending the letter and 
the fact that FHWA disagreed with the granting of such 
concessions as being unfair to other bidders (Taylor testimony at 
Tr. 167-170). 
18. UDOT incurred costs totaling $36,895.65 after it 
terminated the charging of liquidated damages on June 13, 1986 
until September 1986 when Reliance finally completed work on the 
punch list items (exhibit 64). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UDOT assessed a total of $93,600.00 in liquidated damages. 
UDOT's actual engineering related overhead during the period of 
time that the liquidated damages were assessed totaled 
$82,631.16. An added amount of $36,895.65 was incurred after 
time charges were suspended and prior to the completion of "punch 
list" items. UDOT believes there is a reasonable relationship 
between actual costs and the amount assessed. The Court's 
finding to that effect should be sustained. 
The contract between the parties required all work to be 
completed by a date certain, in this case, October 15, 1985. 
UDOT granted 43 days of time prior to completion of the work for 
delay it caused Young and granted an additional 42-day "good 
faith" concession after completion of the work. 
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UDOT alleges that the doctrine of "substantial completion" 
does not apply in this case because the contract requires that 
the work be completed by a date certain and that the court 
correctly ruled that it does not apply to the facts of this case. 
Substantial completion and final completion are the same date in 
a completion date contract. Young's failure to complete 
placement of topsoil until June, 1986 prevented the project from 
being accepted as complete. 
UDOT's ability to accurately account for its actual costs 
does not insure that the parties can agree as to whether costs 
are due to delay in completion or would be incurred in the wrap-
up of any project and for that reason as well as for the fact 
that there are other indirect and unquantified costs which often 
arise incidental to delay liquidated damages are appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES WERE APPROPRIATELY ASSESSED 
A. There is a Reasonable Relationship 
Between the Actual Damages Incurred 
by UDOT and the Amount Assessed. 
The contract between Young and UDOT required that "all 
work be completed by October 15, 1985". The materials site 
clearance error by UDOT delayed Young 43 days. This effectively 
extended the completion date to November 27, 1985. Young became 
liable for liquidated damages after that date. In fact, John Nye 
responded to Young's request and granted the said 43-day 
extension (exhibit 47). The project was accepted as complete by 
UDOT on June 13, 1986. During the period between the said dates, 
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the total of the engineering costs (overhead) charged to the 
project was $82,631.16 (exhibits 64 & 65). 
UDOT had a crew of approximately 18 people assigned during 
1985 under the direction of John Nye (tr. 203). Nye and his crew 
were responsible for two projects (tr. 371). Time charges by the 
crew were made to the two separate projects. Page 1 of Exhibit 
64 is a summary of charges to the project totaling $17,601.37 for 
one two week period in December 1985.1 Nye explained that the 
salaries listed on exhibit 64 which total $3,735.51 actually 
involve only 3 people (tr. 374-375). It is obvious from this 
evidence that UDOT's typical daily overhead charges substantially 
exceeded an average of $1,000.00 per day at a time when the major 
work items had been completed and only finish work was being 
pursued. The stipulated time charge of $600.00 per day is 
certainly reasonable when compared to actual charges made during 
this finish work period. The daily average would no doubt have 
been higher during the time when the major work effort was 
underway. In fact, Nye in a deposition stated that inspection 
costs "on a daily basis was about $1600.00 per day." (Published 
deposition dated July 7, 1988, p. 66) . Inspection is only one of 
many activities that generated engineering charges (overhead) to 
the project. Other division within UDOT also charged expense to 
the project on occasion as explained by Nye (tr. 191). 
1
 Testimony established that Young worked throughout the month 
of December 1985. Nye's crew was on the project but their expenses 
were not charged to the project for half the month of December. 
(Tr. 253-255.) 
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Although not legally obligated to do so, UDOT after 
consultation with FHWA following completion of the work granted 
an additional concession of 42 days in the charging of time for a 
period of time when no work occurred in January and February of 
1986 (exhibit 82), Both of the time extensions were combined 
into a single supplemental agreement several months after all 
work was complete (exhibit 57). The total of the assessed 
liquidated damages is $93,600,00. There is therefore a 
reasonable relationship between the actual overhead costs 
incurred by UDOT after November 27, 1985 and the liquidated 
damages which UDOT assessed. 
Utah law concerning liquidated damages is fairly well 
settled as to the necessity of the relationship between the two 
amounts. Justice Zimmerman in a concurring opinion in the case 
of Allen v. Kingdon. 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986) stated the 
following: 
". . .1 believe this Court routinely applies the 
alternative test of Warner -rwarner v. Rasmussen. 
704 P.2d 599 (Utah 1985)] that the liquidated 
damages must bear some reasonable relationship to 
the actual damages - and that we carefully 
scrutinize liquidated damage awards. . . " 
In a recent case entitled Prudential Capital Group Co. v. 
Mattson, et al.. 802 P.2d 104 (Utah App. 1990), the Court stated 
the following: 
11
. . . Provisions for liquidated damages have been 
upheld the same as other terms in the contract, 
except where the amount of liquidated damages 
"bears no reasonable relationship to the actual 
damages or is so grossly excessive as to be 
entirely disproportionate to any possible loss that 
might have been contemplated that it shocks the 
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conscience . . ." " (citations omitted) 
Following the termination of the daily liquidated damage 
assessment on June 13, 1986, there was a delay of some three 
months before Young actually finished the project by completing 
items of work which were identified during the final inspection 
on July 21, 1986 and set out on a "punch list", which was 
provided to Young on July 23, 1986 (exhibit 83). UDOT incurred a 
total of $36,895.65 in engineering charges related to the 
completion of the punch list items (page 2 of exhibit 64). At 
least one court has held a contractor liable for liquidated 
damages for failure to complete "punch list" items even though 
the project was substantially completed. In the case of Sutter 
Corp. v. Tri-Boro Authority. 487 A.2d 935 (Pa Super. 1985), the 
contractor was held liable for 283.5 days at $200.00 per day for 
failure to complete the punch list items. In that case the court 
said the following: 
11
. . .We hold that the method of listing the 
deficiencies (the punch list) did not require [a 
finding] that the work was complete [at that 
time] ." 
The case has similarities to the instant case in that the owner 
began using the plant at the time the punch list issued whereas 
the highway Young built was also in use at the time the "punch 
list" was issued. The language in the liquidated damage 
provision states that damages will be assessed for "any work that 
shall remain uncompleted". In the instant case the contract 
specifies that damages apply "for each calendar day that any work 
shall remain uncompleted after the contract time specified." The 
13 
language is for all intents and purposes the same in each 
contract. While it is true that# unlike the Tri-Boro case UDOT 
chose not to impose liquidated damages from the time of the 
issuance of the punch list, UDOT did incur damages. UDOT has 
obviously been careful and fair in its imposition of liquidated 
damages. 
B. The Delay in Completion of the Project was 
Not the Fault of UDOT. 
Other than the 43 day delay in completion of the project 
caused by the materials site problem, there is no evidence that 
UDOT in any way caused Young to be delayed in performing the 
work. The project required the importation of borrow material 
to raise the grade of the roadway and the placement of paving. 
The deadline for placement of paving was October 15. UDOT even 
extended that deadline to accommodate Young. October 15 was also 
the date on which the contract specified all work should have 
been completed. With the 43 day extension of time the completion 
date moved to November 27, 1985. Young completed the paving work 
by October 25, 1985, but did not complete the placement of 
signing until January 13, 1986. Under any scenario Young was 
liable for liquidated damages beginning November 28, 1985 through 
January 13, 1986, a total of 47 days. 
On January 13, 1986 the major item of work that remained 
incomplete was the placement and spreading of topsoil. The 
topsoil work had been subcontracted by Young to Sunbird 
Development and evidence shows Young delayed the commencement of 
topsoil work either for its convenience and/or because of the 
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failure of Young to make timely payments to the subcontractor 
(exhibits 42, 49, 50 and 52). There was adequate time granted by 
UDOT to accomplish said work within allowable time limits. This 
fact is evident when you read the July 9, 1986 letter of Sunbird 
Development to Young which letter details how their work of 
hauling and placing topsoil was completed in 30 working days 
(exhibit 52). Rex Friant, Young's supervisor admitted as much 
when he conceded that Nye "was very fair with us" in that he 
granted 85 days of some 98 days requested in time extensions by 
Young (tr. 109). (Alan Young testified that there was no reason 
the topsoil could not have been hauled and placed the fall of 
1985. (Pub. Depo. pp. 50-52 [see APP.]) The evidence further 
shows that the topsoil was placed in piles and not spread at the 
time of placement (tr. 108). The piles were later saturated as 
the result of storms which then required that it be left in place 
pending weather which would allow the topsoil to dry out (exhibit 
52). This is not the fault of UDOT. When the weather moderated 
the resumption of operations was delayed as the result of payment 
problems which again was not the fault nor responsibility of UDOT 
(exhibits 42 and 52). 
In summary, Young was in total control of the project 
between November 28, 1985 and June 13, 1986 and determined the 
time it would perform work or shut down the project all without 
any control or interference by UDOT. Young, not UDOT was 
responsible for the delay and Reliance should not be rewarded by 
being allowed to recover the liquidated damages which were 
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properly assessed. 
C. Appropriate Extensions of Time Were Granted by UDOT. 
The contract is clear as to what is allowed in the way of 
time extensions in the case of completion date contracts. 
Essentially UDOT is allowed to grant additional time for added 
work and for conditions "beyond the control or without the fault 
of the contractor" (statement of fact no. 2). Completion day 
contracts do not allow for extensions of time related to normal 
weather occurrences, or delays in delivery of materials or 
supplies which might otherwise result in time extensions on a 
working day contract (statement of fact no. 1). 
UDOT accepted responsibility for the delay related to the 
materials site and granted an extension of 43 days. There was no 
other event or condition which would justify a time extension 
under terms of the contract. 
The project is a federal aid project and time extensions 
require approval of FHWA in order for UDOT to insure its right to 
federal aid. John Nye, the project engineer, conferred with an 
FHWA official and secured approval for a waiver of time charges 
totaling 42 days. This was approved on the basis that there was 
a period covering 42 days during the mid part of the winter when 
no work occurred on the project. (exhibit 82 and tr pp 233-240) 
Said waiver was not required by any contract provision nor is it 
specifically allowed by the contract, and is simply a good faith 
concession. 
The Chief Construction Engineer for UDOT, Bert Taylor, 
16 
sought approval at a later time from FHWA for a further 
concession as to the charging of time (exhibits 58 and 59). The 
FHWA declined Taylor's request. Had UDOT elected to grant a 
further concession it would have been at state expense (tr. 166). 
The attitude of the FHWA is not unreasonable. UDOT received 
federal aid for engineering charges during the period of time 
that Young was subject to the imposition of liquidated damages. 
It would be unfair to the public at large who had already been 
required to reimburse UDOT for costs approximating the amount of 
the liquidated damages, as well as to other bidders who bid in 
anticipation of meeting the contract completion date, for UDOT to 
grant a further time concession (tr. 168-169). Indeed, John Nye 
stated that after conferring with FHWA at the time the 42-day 
time extension was obtained that he concurred in the decision as 
being fair (tr. 260-261). 
The total time extension of 85 days is both fair and 
reasonable considering the work which remained uncompleted on 
October 15,1985. 
D. Finding of Fact Number 30 is Supported by the 
Evidence. 
Reliance takes issue with Finding of Fact Number 30 
regarding the adequacy of the evidence of "continuing overhead" 
and goes to great length to examine specific statements made by 
individual UDOT witnesses in an apparent effort to retry the 
facts. UDOT submits that there is ample evidence to support the 
findings of the court. 
Reliance represents in Point II, Number 3 of its brief 
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that it has marshalled the evidence in support of Finding of Fact 
number 30 and that it does not support the court's finding, but 
it is clear that they have ignored evidence that supports the 
court's finding. Their attempt falls short of the standard set 
by the court in a line of cases beginning with Scharf v. BMG 
Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The Court of Appeals in 
the case of State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990) stated 
the following: 
The process of marshalling the evidence serves the im-
portant function of reminding litigants and appellate 
courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder 
at trial. . . . We believe that this deference is 
appropriate and important in both civil and criminal 
cases." 
See also Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 
1987); State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Reid v. Mutual 
of Omaha. 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989); Wright v. Westside 
Nursery. 787 P.2d, 508, 513-514 (Utah App. 1990) 
Reliance focuses on a statement made by the trial judge at 
the time he rendered his decision and assumes that the statement 
limits the court in its findings. The trial judge stated the 
following: "However, the court does feel that there is ample 
evidence in the record indicating and supporting the notion that 
some 65 or 70,000-1 can't recall the specific figures-of 
continuing overhead costs . . . " were incurred by UDOT as being 
reasonably related to the calculated amount of liquidated 
damages. (Bench Decision p. 12.) In actual fact, the $65,000 
amount covers the period between January and June of 1986, as 
explained in Section I A of this brief, there was also additional 
18 
evidence for the month of December 1985 totalling some $17#000 
for a combined total in excess of $82,000 (exhibits 64 & 65). 
The Court was well aware of this evidence by the time it entered 
its judgment. UDOT's counsel explained the relationship of the 
two exhibits in its Post Trial Brief (R. 433-435) . It was also 
pointed out in said brief that while there were no charges to the 
project for over half the month of December 1985, state personnel 
were on the project during the time that Young worked (R. at 
434). UDOT's counsel prepared a detailed factual finding with 
both figures as well as additional detail following trial and the 
rendering of the "bench decision". (See Appendix.) Counsel for 
Reliance objected to the findings and conclusions in the format 
which UDOT's counsel submitted them. (R. at 460-469.)2 After 
Reliance's objections were reviewed as well as the proposed 
findings and conclusions, counsel for UDOT prepared Finding of 
Fact number 30 (R. 480, ^  30) which is admittedly general in 
nature at the specific suggestion of the trial judge. Reliance 
apparently wants to ignore the costs which UDOT incurred in 
December 1985 since it makes the disparity between the calculated 
amount of liquidated damages and the actual damages greater. 
Reliance hangs on the stipulated fact that the contract was 
extended to January 8, 1986 and that UDOT is not allowed to 
assert the December 1985 charges as part of the justification for 
2
 UDOT's proposed Findings and Conclusions of Law are not part 
of the record for some unknown reason. The objections of Reliance 
are of record and for that reason UDOT has set forth its Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the appendix for 
reference along with Reliance's objections. 
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the liquidated damages which were assessed. While the contract 
was ultimately extended 85 days which is the same as though it 
were extended to January 8, 1986, the extension actually occurred 
in two widely separated time periods as explained above. The 
first extension of 43 days was granted April 15, 1986 by letter 
from John Nye to Young. The work was still being performed by 
Reliance at that time. In that same letter Nye denied any 
further extension (exhibit 47). That means that it was November 
27, 1985 when the project should have been completed and the 
December 1985 engineering charges properly support the court's 
finding. The 42- day time concession was granted after all work 
was complete. 
Reliance argues that not all of the expenses set forth in 
the exhibits which summarize charges made to the project 
represent increased overhead. They analyze the testimony of two 
of UDOT's witnesses in great detail in an attempt to separate 
"increased overhead" from the cost of activities which UDOT would 
have incurred had the project been completed timely. There may 
well be some inconsistency between the actual charges and the 
testimony of the UDOT witnesses as to what specific activities 
crew members were involved in during the period between December 
1985 and June 1986. That is no doubt caused by the recollection 
of the witnesses and the fact that the crew was administering two 
projects at the same time. However, the detailed exhibits which 
list charges made to the project and which are summarized in 
exhibits 64 and 65 clearly show two types of charges. One type 
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is time related and includes equipment rental, office expenses, 
and various other expenses which occur with the passage of time. 
Clearly this type of expense would be considered as increased or 
extended overhead. The other type of charge is related to 
personnel and would be tied to activities which are normally 
charged to a specific project depending on the individual 
employees specific assignment. These charges may or may not be 
in the category of "increased overhead". John Nye stated that 
the salaries listed on page 1 of exhibit 64 for part of the month 
of December 1985 actually involved 2 people. One was the 
inspector who was assigned to the project to monitor daily 
activities, and one was John Nye himself (tr. 379). Nye 
testified that he was on the project daily and devoted 
considerable time to the project because it was over the allowed 
time (tr. 383) . The charges for salaries listed on page 1 of 
exhibit 64 thus qualify as either "increased" or "extended' 
overhead; and to the extent that the salaries listed on page 2 
cover said individuals, they would also represent extended 
overhead. The time devoted by these individuals would not have 
been necessitated had the work been completed timely. 
Nye testified that the late completion of the project 
resulted in overtime and required spliting his crew between both 
projects (tr. 372). No attempt was made to quantify overtime 
charges to the other project which may have been caused by the 
need to assign crew members to the project. The increased cost 
further justifies the liquidated damage assessment in this case. 
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Reliance failed to deal with this evidence in its attempt at 
marshalling the evidence. 
The Court was not incorrect in finding that the evidence 
supports the fact that UDOT incurred increased or "continuing" 
overhead that justifies the imposition of the liquidated damages. 
Reliance attempts to draw a distinction between "increased 
overhead", the term used in section 108.08, and "continuing 
overhead", the term used in Finding of Fact number 30. UDOT 
submits that they are one and the same in the context of this 
case. The overhead was increased because it continued as a 
result of Young's failure to complete the work timely. 
The evidence supports the findings and conclusions of the 
trial court. Everything Reliance has alleged in its brief 
concerning factual support for Finding of Fact number 30 was 
submitted to the trial court and was rejected by the court. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION DOES 
NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
A. The Terms of the Contract Require 
All Work to be Completed by a Date 
Certain in Order to Avoid the 
Imposition of Liquidated Damages. 
UDOT had many obvious reasons for specifying that the work 
be completed by a date certain. The most obvious reason was the 
rising waters of the Great Salt Lake which in early 1985 were 
threatening to inundate Interstate 1-80. This was the third year 
of a three-year record wet cycle. Another reason was the fact 
that the work had to be accomplished while traffic was using the 
highway. By insisting on a completion date UDOT obviously hoped 
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to limit danger to the motoring public from construction 
activities (tr. 101-104). Other reasons include economy in the 
assignment of personnel to the project for inspection and 
monitoring of the work. This project was an emergency project 
and had to be inserted into a schedule which included other 
projects. 
All of the claims and justification asserted by Young 
during performance of the work in an effort to secure added time 
would not support a time extension to a completion date contract 
except for the error by UDOT in the clearance of the materials 
site. The contract specifications severely limit the engineer's 
authority to extend completion day contracts (sections 108.06 and 
108.07 of the standard specifications, exhibits 41 &42 and tr. 
101) . 
UDOT expected Young would plan the work such that the 
completion date could be met. In most completion date contracts 
meticulous planning and scheduling are required as well as the 
commitment of additional equipment and personnel to insure that 
the date for completion is achieved. Completion date contracts 
are not extended unless the contractor performs additional work 
or the engineer finds that the contractor was delayed because of 
conditions "beyond the control and without the fault of the 
contractor." (Exhibit 4# Sections 108.06 and 108.07.) The 
evidence in this case shows that Young was delayed in achieving a 
level of completion that would justify termination of time 
charges because of normal winter weather, a failure to properly 
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plan and schedule the placement of the topsoil, and problems 
associated with the take over of Young by Reliance. A large part 
of the problem was related to payment by Young and/or Reliance to 
the subcontractor employed to haul and place the topsoil. None 
of these factors justify a time extension. 
The contract specifies that the date set for completion is 
the date on which "all work shall be completed." No contractor 
has a right to expect a waiver of liquidated damages when the 
specified date for completion is exceeded because of its own 
actions. 
B. Substantial Completion Does Not Apply 
Because the Contract is a Completion Day 
Contract and Does Not Contemplate 
"Substantial Completion". 
Reliance in Point I of its brief argues that the lower 
court erred in ruling that "substantial completion does not apply 
to the facts of this case", and that case law does not exist in 
Utah to that effect, which ruling is set forth in conclusion of 
law number 5. Reliance's argument mischaracterizes the Court's 
ruling. The ruling of the court does not reject the concept of 
"substantial completion", it merely holds that it doesn't apply 
to the facts of this case. 
It is significant that Reliances' research was unable to 
discover a Utah case which deals with the doctrine of substantial 
completion and particularly one which addresses the issue of 
timely performance. The case of Stephens v. Doxey (198 P.2d 261 
(Utah 1921) which Reliance alleges supports the doctrine of 
substantial performance merely states a general rule of equity as 
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it applies to an issue of the performance of a contract. The 
case involves a dispute between an owner and a contractor over 
whether the job performance was complete. Clearly the building 
did not meet the owners expectation. The owner was using the 
building and the court merely held that the owner could not to 
expect to escape the obligation to pay and that the contractor 
would have to accept less than the full contract amount because 
the evidence revealed that the job was not fully acceptable. 
There was not a clearly defined contract or specifications by 
which performance could be measured and the court recognized the 
resultant difficulty. The case has nothing to do with the issue 
of substantial completion. The case is best summarized by the 
following quote by the court: 
"This case, in many of its aspects, is a most 
peculiar one, and presents many difficulties in 
attempting to arrive at the legal rights of the 
respective parties. 
The court simply resorted to an equitable resolution of 
the case. The case is essentially an affirmation of the doctrine 
of quantum meruit. By contrast there is no need for an equitable 
resolution in this case since the contract terms are clear. 
The term "substantial completion" is sometimes defined in 
contract specifications, most notably in the case of buildings 
and structures that are to be occupied. It is that point in the 
construction when the building or structure can be safely 
occupied and/or be used for its intended purpose while final 
completion is still in the future. Standard architectural 
specifications usually provide that time charges will cease or be 
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reduced at the point of "substantial completion".3 The standard 
specifications applicable to the instant contract do not make 
reference to substantial completion. They do provide for 
"partial suspension" which means that the project engineer can 
reduce the daily time charge to a fraction of a day on a project 
when work is suspended on some but not all items of work. 
However the specifications state that "partial suspension may 
apply to working or calendar day projects." (Finding of Fact No. 
1.) Completion date contracts are not mentioned since they 
provide that all work is to be completed by a specified date. In 
this instance "substantial completion" and "final completion" are 
one and the same. 
The standard specifications applicable to this contract in 
section 108.08 specify that liquidated damages are for 
"Departments increased overhead". This is consistent with the 
general concern that most owners have when they let a 
construction contract. One treatise states it this way: 
"While avoidance of delays on a construction project 
can increase the effective earnings of the contractor, timely 
completion is principally a concern for the owner, since the use 
and enjoyment of the project and revenues to be derived therefrom 
are dependent on it." (Construction Law, Sec. 3.03 [1][a] 
3
 The Division of Facilities Construction and Management of 
the State of Utah in their General Conditions applicable to 
building construction define "substantial completion" as follows: 
"Substantial Completion is the date certified by the Architect . . 
. and generally means the date the Work . . . is sufficiently 
complete in accordance with the Contract Documents so that the 
Owner can occupy and utilize the Work for its intended use . ..." 
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Matthew-Bender•) 
In this case, the facts show that even though the contract 
was completed to the degree that it was open to safe use of 
traffic and that signs were in place as of January 13, 1986, 
overhead charges continued to be charged to the contract until 
September 1986. The charges include both personnel costs and 
those which are simply related to time such as utilities and 
equipment rental. It was necessary to monitor the project, and 
those items of work that occurred intermittently solely at the 
whim of the contractor between January and June of 1986 when UDOT 
terminated the charging of time. 
UDOT recognizes that while no Utah cases deal specifically 
with the issue of "substantial completion" that it is a valid 
concept and may apply in cases which do not specify a completion 
date, or which define how it is to be determined. However 
because of the specific language in the contract specifications 
which govern completion day contracts UDOT submits that the 
doctrine does not apply. In other words the contract 
contemplates that substantial completion and final completion are 
one and the same. 
The North Carolina Appellate Court construed a provision 
similar to Section 108.08 in the case of Ledbetter Brothers. Inc. 
v. North Carolina Department of Transportation. 314 S.E.2d 761 
(NC App. 1984). On the issue of "substantial completion" in a 
contract where a completion date was specified similar to the 
instant case the court held that the Department of Transportation 
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had discretion as to when a contract is to be considered 
complete. The only restriction was that the Department had to 
act in "good faith". Neither in that case nor in this case is 
there evidence of bad faith in the assessment of liquidated 
damages. The Court stated the following in commenting concerning 
the purpose of liquidated damages: 
11
. . .Aside from their compensatory function, 
liquidated damages provisions have long been held 
valid and consistent with public policy as an 
appropriate means of inducing due performance 
(citing Robinson v. U.S.. 261 U.S. 486, 43 S. Ct. 
420 (1923). It would frustrate this policy, and 
increase the likelihood of inconvenience and danger 
to the public, to allow disputes, over substantial 
performance to affect such provisions. The intent 
of the damages provision is clear and its 
application proper." 
Reliance attempts to distinguish Ledbetter from the instant case 
by indulging in speculation. After pointing out that certain 
facts cannot be discerned from the opinion in Ledbetter and after 
listing certain criteria which Reliance believes supports its 
position, it is stated that: 
"It is possible that, using the criteria enumerated 
above, the court in Ledbetter would have properly 
concluded that the highway in that case was not 
available for its intended use . . .". 
It is of course possible, but it is more likely that the reverse 
would be true. Most state highway specifications are patterned 
after the AASHTO guide specifications and as a result are very 
similar. The Ledbetter decision illustrates how difficult it is 
to apply traditional cases dealing with liquidated damages to 
highway contracts. Unless a project is fully completed a highway 
agency continues to suffer overhead costs. "Substantial 
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completion" doesn't usually terminate such costs as inspection 
and monitoring and all the related costs of personnel and 
equipment. The North Carolina provision adds the cost to the 
public along with its own overhead cost as an additional 
justification for its daily assessment. Other than the said 
added cost justification, the North Carolina provision and the 
Utah provision are essentially the same. The Ledbetter decision 
is therefore a good precedent for the situation in this case.4 
See also Osceola County v. Bumble Bee Constr.. 479 So. 2d. 310 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) where liquidated damages were allowed 
when a structure was not ready for use and damages were not 
determinable at the time the contract was entered into. 
UDOT respectfully submits that the terms of the contract 
are clear and that the issue is not whether Young is entitled to 
relief based on a theory of "substantial completion" but rather 
when was the project complete, meaning final completion. Final 
completion in the context of a completion date contract could be 
construed as 100% complete. It is clear from the facts of this 
case that it was something less than 100% completion since that 
did not occur until September 1986 when the punch list items were 
finally complete, whereas time charges were suspended in June, 
4
 AASHTO is an organization of state highway and 
transportation officials who assist the transportation industry 
with research and technical assistance. Individual state agencies 
use such guidance in the formulation of their contract provisions 
which deal with liquidated damages as well as most other general 
provisions. UDOT does not mean to imply that its specifications 
dealing with liquidated damages are the same as North Carolina, but 
they are similar and are variations of the AASHTO guide 
specifications. 
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finally complete, whereas time charges were suspended in June, 
1986 when the topsoil and seeding were finally accomplished. 
UDOT acted in good faith in its assessment of when the project 
was to be considered as complete for the purpose of suspending 
overtime charges. 
Reliance argues that the largest portion of uncompleted 
work was landscaping items "which did not impact the safety or 
convenience of the public". That statement is absolutely untrue 
and without foundation. Interstate 1-80 is a major freeway and 
motorists using it expect to be free of the hazard posed by slow 
moving construction traffic or construction activities which pose 
a risk to high speed traffic. Any delay in completion creates 
more safety hazards to motorists, contractor personnel and UDOT 
employees. While it may be true that the dollar amount involved 
with placing topsoil and seeding represents a small percentage of 
the project cost, the impact on the general public and UDOT is 
significant. For that reason UDOT was justified in assessing 
liquidated damages since such activities require close inspection 
and monitoring to insure both contract compliance as well as 
safety compliance. There was simply no justifiable reason for 
UDOT's engineer to terminate the charging of liquidated damages 
until June 13, 1986 when the topsoil item was completed. Except 
for the period of 42 days in January and February 1986 during 
which UDOT waived the assessment of time charges, the contractor 
was engaged in various activities which required inspection and 
monitoring. The work involved with the topsoil took about 30 
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days to accomplish in actual effort but it was spaced out from 
October 1985 until June 1986. The engineer was certainly 
justified in refusing to waive the assessment of the liquidated 
damages since Young was responsible for the delay and the 
resultant expense to UDOT. 
Reliance argues that the highway was complete for all 
intents and purposes and open to traffic and that it is improper 
to assess liquidated damages. One Court has ruled in a highway 
case that an otherwise valid liquidated damage clause will 
normally be enforced even though no actual damages were 
sustained. In that case the court allowed recovery of 52 days of 
liquidated damages even though the highway was open on schedule 
(see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. City of Chicago. 350 F.2d. 649 (7th 
cir. 1965). 
C. The Liquidated Damages Are Not a Penalty as 
Alleged by Reliance, but UDOT Would Have 
Suffered a Penalty had They Not Been 
Assessed. 
Reliance alleges that the liquidated damages imposed 
pursuant to the contract result in a penalty. In support of this 
allegation Reliance argues that the project was substantially 
completed, and that UDOT was not forced to assess "this $100,000 
penalty." Reliance alleges further that 99.9 percent of the 
contract was performed and that this should excuse Reliance from 
paying 100 percent of the liquidated damages. In response, it 
should be made clear that there is no $100,000 "penalty." The 
total amount of the liquidated damages is $93,600. It is 
inaccurate and in fact it is a misrepresentation for Reliance to 
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suggest that the project was 99.9 percent complete during the 
time the liquidated damages were accruing. On June 13, 1986 when 
the project was accepted as complete it was still less than 99.9 
percent complete. On July 21, 1986 when the punch list was 
issued there was still work to be completed, even though the 
assessment of liquidated damages was suspended. 
The major item which was uncompleted on January 13, 1986 
was the topsoil item. It was significant enough in dollar amount 
and the impact upon the safety of the motoring public posed by 
its handling and placement that the project could not be 
considered complete. When Young became liable for liquidated 
damages beginning November 28, 1985, the project was 89 percent 
complete according to UDOT's calculations. As late as May 17, 
1986 when Young's subcontractor began hauling the topsoil the 
percentage of completion was shown as 90% on UDOT's weekly 
progress reports (exhibit 34, no. 55). Obviously Young did not 
accomplish much work during the winter months of 1986 as 
evidenced by the said weekly progress reports. What they did 
accomplish was to keep some UDOT personnel and equipment captive 
to the project. 
UDOT's liquidated damage provision is not intended to 
induce timely performance. It is intended rather, to compensate 
UDOT for its expense associated with the delay in performance. 
It is therefore a valid provision and not a penalty. Similar 
provisions have been upheld for that reason (see Loggins Const. 
Co. v. Stephen F. Austin University Board of Regents. 543 S.W. 2d 
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682 Tex Civ. App. 1976 and S.L. Rowland Const. Co. v. Beall 
Pipe & Tank Corp.. 540 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1975). 
In response to Reliance's argument that UDOT was not 
forced to assess "this $100,000 penalty", UDOT, in addition to 
its objections to Reliance's characterization of liquidated 
damages as a "penalty" and to the said amount as being an 
exaggeration, simply refers to the contract provisions which in 
UDOT's view do not allow relief to a contractor when the 
completion date specified is not met. The contract obligates 
UDOT to assess the full time charge until the contract is 
completed and accepted. Section 108.06 of the Standard 
Specifications does not authorize a partial suspension of the 
daily time charge. It is in fact specifically provided that the 
specified sum ($600) shall be assessed for each day beyond the 
completion date that the project remains uncompleted (see Finding 
of Fact No. 2). 
The trial court was absolutely correct in citing the case 
of Ted R. Brown & Associates. Inc. Carnes Corp.. 753 P.2d 964 
(Utah App. 1988) for the proposition that the Court should not 
reform a contract simply because the terms appear harsh. If the 
contract is clear the parties should be left to the remedies of 
the contract and should be entitled to enforce its terms. The 
Court took this position in the case of Western Engineers. Inc. 
v. State Road Commission. 437 P.2d 216 (Utah 1968) wherein the 
contractor was denied relief for delay damages associated with 
the time delay involved in revising plans because the contract 
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contained a no damage for delay provision even though the delay 
was upwards of a year. 
Obviously the imposition of $93,600 in liquidated damages 
is a significant amount and in the opinion of Reliance qualifies 
as a "penalty". By failing to enforce the contract terms UDOT 
cannot be assured that it will receive federal aid reimbursement. 
Certainly UDOT could decide on its own to waive or reduce the 
daily charge for liquidated damages but in that event the FHWA 
could justifiably refuse to concur in such concession. This 
would mean that UDOT would lose federal aid reimbursement on 
whatever amount it elected to waive.5 That would clearly result 
in a penalty to UDOT. The trial court recognized the dilemma 
such a waiver would pose to UDOT in its relationship with FHWA 
and the need and necessity for UDOT to strictly enforce its 
contract with Young according to its terms and as expected by 
FHWA. Strict enforcement is necessary to preserve the 
relationship between UDOT and FHWA. It is also necessary to keep 
faith with other competing contractors who bid in the expectation 
of meeting the completion date. 
Reliance cites the case of S.L. Rowland Const. Co. v. 
Beall Pipe and Tank Corporation. 540 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1975), 
as authority for its contention that UDOT's liquidated damage 
provision is a penalty provision. There are significant 
5
 In fact, FHWA did not concur in the 43-day time extension 
UDOT allowed for the error in clearing the materials site for usage 
by Young. FHWA considered the failure to be the fault of UDOT and 
declined to participate in the cost of moving the contractor or in 
the allowance of added time. (Tr. 231-232.) 
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distinctions between that case and this case. In Rowland, the 
owner sought to enforce the liquidated damage provision during 
the period following the time when the pipeline was placed in 
operation and the completion of the punch list work items. In 
this case no damages were assessed after acceptance of the 
project on June 13, 1986 and the completion of the punch list 
items which occurred in September 1986, even though UDOT incurred 
engineering costs totalling over $36,000 during that period. 
UDOT's daily charge was approximately the same as its actual 
costs during the time it was assessed unlike Rowland. 
UDOT's liquidated damage provision does allow for a reduced 
daily charge when some items of work are suspended. It is called 
partial suspension, but it only applies when contract time is 
assessed based on working or calendar days. To apply partial 
suspension to a completion date contract would defeat the purpose 
of specifying a completion date. 
The question which should be the focus of the court's 
concern is why did Young let the topsoil work, which took less 
than 30 days of actual work time, drag on from October 1985 until 
June 1986, a period of eight months? Reliance acquired control 
of Young during said time period and failed to make necessary 
arrangements to expedite the work. It's a little late in the day 
to secure concessions after UDOT incurred the added costs as a 
result of disorganized and intermittent work efforts by Young and 
Reliance. 
UDOT acted responsibly by granting time concessions which 
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reduced the amount of liquidated damages. FHWA was not 
unreasonable in its attitude concerning time extensions. There 
was a 42-day time extension granted based on the recognition that 
no work occurred during the mid-winter of 1986. UDOT sought 
additional relief by forwarding a letter from counsel for 
Reliance to FHWA. UDOT may have granted some added relief had 
FHWA concurred. In the absence of such concurrence by FHWA UDOT 
certainly has no duty to unilaterally grant a concession to 
Reliance at its expense. 
III. THE ABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR ACTUAL COSTS 
INCURRED FOR ENGINEERING AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS DOES NOT ELIMINATE 
THE NEED FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 
Reliance's arguments under Points II and III of its brief 
appear to be at cross purposes. 
Under Point II# Reliance argues that the liquidated 
damages provision should not be upheld because UDOT's ". . . 
'increased overhead'--was highly capable and easy to accurately 
estimate at the time the contract was executed. . .". This 
argument is based on the fact that UDOT "records in great detail 
its engineering charges, etc.". Reliance cites as authority for 
this assertion the Restatement of Contracts. Section 339, and 
specifically subparagraph 1 (b) which provides that a provision 
for liquidated damages must fail unless: 
(b) The harm that is caused by the breach is one that 
is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. UDOT 
disagrees with this assertion by Reliance and alleges that just 
because it records its actual engineering charges does not mean 
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that it can automatically discern between those charges which 
represent increased overhead and those which it would likely 
incur in any event. It certainly isn't feasible to do so in 
advance of the occupance. If this argument were correct it would 
mean that anyone who kept accurate records of its expenditures 
could not rely on a liquidated damage provision in a contract. 
That clearly is not the intent of the Restatement of Contracts. 
Whether a liquidated damage amount is reasonable or not is to be 
considered in light of the facts known to the parties at the time 
of contracting. (See Wise v. U.S.. 249 U.S. 361 (1919); 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. City of Chicago. 350 F.2d.649 (7th Cir. 
1965); Southwest Engineering Co. v. U.S.. 341 F.2d. 998 (8th Cir. 
1965) and P.T.&L. Const. Co. v. New Jersey D.O.T. (N.J. Ct. App. 
1986) (unpublished opinion), in which no damage claim was ruled 
enforceable despite 192 day delay, since sophisticated contractor 
was knowledgeable about contract terms.) 
The fact that a delay in completion results in a damage to 
UDOT is clear enough. The nature and extent of the damage is 
what is not predictable. The specified daily charge is based on 
the dollar amount of the contract and represents a minimum 
amount. The project in question was approximately $9f000,000 and 
it doesn't require much effort to justify the daily charge 
specified considering the number of contract items and the 
complexity of the project. According to one authority there is a 
three-part test which Courts apply to determine whether a 
liquidated damage provision is enforceable or whether it is a 
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penalty. The three questions are: (1) Is the liquidated sum a 
reasonable forecast of the damages likely to be sustained as a 
result of the delay in performance? (2) Is the actual amount of 
damages likely to be sustained difficult or impossible to 
ascertain? and (3) Was the clause intended to compensate for 
damages actually sustained, or is it intended to penalize the 
breaching party? (Construction Lawf Stein, Matthew-Bender, Vol. 
2, Par 6.10. UDOT's liquidated damages provisions clearly meet 
this test as explained herein. 
The nature and extent of work remaining to be completed by 
Young when the liquidated damage liability commenced in this case 
was relatively straight forward and easy to calculate. As is 
evident from Reliance's argument under its 3rd point and its 
retrial of the facts in its brief there is little agreement 
between Reliance and UDOT as to what constitutes increased 
overhead. It should be obvious that the ability to determine 
actual costs does not necessarily make the task of assigning 
those costs as "increased overhead" or as overhead which would 
occur regardless of timely completion an easy task. As noted 
earlier there is evidence that not all of the costs incurred by 
UDOT applicable to this project were actually charged to the 
project. That is further justification for their use. 
Reliance's allegations under point II of its brief to the 
effect that UDOT is "making an example of Young" or that UDOT is 
"punishing Young-decapitating Young, as it were, and placing its 
head on a pole for all to see" is nothing but ridiculous and 
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inflammatory rhetoric. UDOT is obligated to enforce its 
contracts if it expects to qualify for federal aid reimbursement. 
It has a duty to other contractors who bid on the project to 
enforce its contract terms. No one associated with UDOT was out 
to "make an example" of Young or to "punish" Young. In fact the 
record shows a willingness on the part of UDOT to try and honor 
the requests of both Young and Reliance to reduce the amount of 
liquidated damages even beyond anything allowed by the contract. 
The 42 day period wherein UDOT waived the liquidated damage 
assessment with the concurrence of FHWA is a significant 
concession. Such action by UDOT clearly demonstrates that 
Reliance is wrong to make such assertions. Reliance should not 
be heard to complain because UDOT elected to enforce the terms of 
the contract when it as well as Young failed to make necessary 
arrangements to complete the topsoil placement for several 
months. 
Even if Reliance's argument under point II of its brief to 
the effect that UDOT's increased overhead "can be calculated with 
great accuracy" is true# the evidence in this case shows actual 
engineering charges between December 1985 and September 1986 
totaling well in excess of the $93,600 assessment. After 
deducting a reasonable sum for costs and expenses that UDOT would 
have incurred to wrap up the project had the project been 
completed timely there are still "increased" or "extended" 
overhead costs which equal or exceed the assessment made by UDOT. 
Under point III of its brief Reliance reverses its 
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argument and seeks to challenge and discredit the charges made to 
the project as being necessary even if the project were completed 
timely. This type of controversy and disagreement is exactly why 
the use of liquidated damages is favored and frequently used. 
Earlier in this brief we explained that the engineering 
charges as summarized on exhibits 64 and 65 totaling in excess of 
$82,000 both relate to the period of time when the liquidated 
damages accrued. There is also the crew overtime charged to the 
other project and costs incurred for part of the month of 
December which were not charged to this project which would help 
to support and justify the liquidated damage assessment. 
Reliance wants to discount some of the costs listed in exhibit 65 
as being necessary to wrap up the project by asserting that they 
would have been incurred regardless of the time the project was 
completed. Even if allowance is made for charges which would 
relate to activities that occur in the wrap-up of any project, 
the remaining actual charges attributable to the failure of Young 
to complete the work on time still reasonably relate to the 
amount assessed as liquidated damages. It should be noted that 
UDOT incurred an additional $36,000 of documented charges while 
waiting for Reliance to complete the "punch list" items between 
June and September, 1986. Reliance attempts by its argument to 
depict UDOT as being in the wrong because it relies upon the 
contract terms. This approach ignores the fact that Reliance has 
no one to blame but itself and Young for the fact that it is 
liable for liquidated damages in the first place. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Liquidated damages are appropriate and justified by the evidence. 
The doctrine of substantial completion has no application in this 
case. The contract provisions are clear as to the requirement 
that all work was to have been complete as of the date specified 
in the contract. UDOT extended the contract completion date as 
required and allowed by reason of the 43 day delay caused by 
UDOT. UDOT's damages in the form of extended and/or increased 
overhead consisting of engineering and administrative costs bear 
a reasonable relationship to the sum assessed as liquidated 
damages. The delay in completion is attributable to Reliance and 
its assignor Young, both of which are knowledgeable entities who 
understood the contract requirements related to the specified 
completion date. UDOT is obligated to enforce its contract terms 
and in that connection is answerable to the public, to other 
bidders and to FHWA# the agency which controls federal-aid 
funding. Finally, the evidence shows that UDOT extended the 
contract a total of 85 days which according to Young's witnesses 
was adequate time to complete the work and substantially equal to 
the time extension requested. 
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The Judgment of $1200.00 plus interest in favor of 
Reliance and for costs in the amount of $163.00 to UDOT should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1992. 
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